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Abstract 
This article investigates the European Commission under the Presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker during 
a time of acute crisis in the European Union.  It asks what it mean for Juncker to preside over a ‘political 
Commission’, following his appointment as the so-called Spitzencandidat of the centre-right after the 
2014 European Parliament (EP) election.  More generally, it considers what makes the Juncker 
Commission distinctive.  We ask whether Juncker views his EP mandate as giving him license to head 
a Commission that is ambitious than those headed by his predecessor, José Manuel Barroso.  We 
provide empirical raw material for theorising about the EU, particularly given the prominence of the 
new intergovernmentalism as a theoretical paradigm of European integration.  We argue that it is time 
to redefine the term ‘intergovernmental’, especially given how the Commission has become more 
directly linked to and dependent on EU national capitals in a time of acute crisis.  
 
Keywords:  European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, new intergovernmentalism, 
Spitzenkcanditaten system, José Manuel Barroso 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Elizabeth Bomberg, Megan Dee, Liesbet Hooghe, Renke Deckarm and three anonymous 
reviewers for comments on earlier drafts, as well as attendees at presentations made at the 2015 EU Studies 
Association conference (Boston), the Center for Transatlantic Relations (Washington DC), Princeton University, 
and the Politics and IR Research Seminar (Edinburgh).  Special thanks are due to 19 officials who granted 
interviews in January, July and October 2015 that yielded the original data set on which the article draws.  The 
main bases for interviewee selection were 1) seniority, 2) nationality (officials of 10 different nationalities 
consulted); and representation of different elements of the Commission.  Posts held by interviewees were: 
chefs (5), deputy chef (1), Directors-General (2), Directors (4), Heads of Unit (4), Secretariat-General (2) as well 
as (1) official in the EU External Action Service. 
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It comes as no surprise that many recent works on the European Union (EU) focus on ‘crisis’.1  By late 
2015, George Soros (2015: 4) claimed that the EU faced five crises – migration, the euro, Greece, 
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom’s (UK) referendum on continued membership.  By mid-2016, the 
European Commission under Jean-Claude Juncker neared the halfway point of its mandate.  Given the 
Commission’s vast policy responsibilities and the concurrence of so many crises, it was hardly 
encouraging that its President was a ‘confirmed technocrat’ whose appointment ‘did not move the EU 
far from business as usual, even in a time of extraordinary tension over the euro crisis and the EU’s 
future’ (McNamara 2015a: 34; see also McNamara 2015b).  The choice of Juncker reflected – in 
McNamara’s (2015a: 34) view of what others have called ‘leaderless Europe’ (Hayward 2008) – ‘the 
EU’s tradition of banality and deracination’.  
 
This portrait may have fit the EU of the past, but it is challenged not least by Juncker’s appointment, 
the nature of his Commission as well as other appointments to top EU posts.  Juncker’s experience at 
the highest political levels – Prime Minister of Luxembourg for 18 years and chair of the Eurogroup of 
Eurozone Finance Ministers for 8 – defies the description ‘technocrat’.  Whether the process by which 
Juncker was chosen reflected only ‘small steps…toward a true electoral contest for the European 
Commission President’ (McNamara 2015: 34) is at least contestable.  Juncker was the first Commission 
President selected under the Spitzenkandidaten system, whereby the European Parliament’s (EP) 
political groups nominated candidates with EU member governments obliged by the Lisbon Treaty to 
take account of the results of EP elections in choosing a President.2  Juncker’s Commission was also 
the first to be structured on a two-tier basis, with a group of Vice-Presidents (7 plus Juncker himself) 
overseeing the work of 20 other Commissioners.   Finally, Juncker’s declaration that his would be a 
‘political Commission’ raised questions about its role at a time when austerity stirred strong anti-EU 
impulses, little consensus existed about the direction Europe needed to take, and Germany’s political 
dominance seemed undeniable.  Half of a 5 year Commission mandate provides a limited sample size 
from which to judge what it means to be a ‘political Commission’.  Still, we offer as complete an 
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investigation as is possible of how Juncker got the job, organised his College, and how it operates.  
Above all, we explore whether Juncker’s designation of his as a different kind of Commission is a 
response to a new intergovernmentalism that (paradoxically) has seen EU member states embrace 
‘integration without surpanationalization’ (Bickerton et al 2015: 39) and has revealed them to be 
‘deeply reluctant to cede further powers to the Commission’ (Bickerton et al 2015: 5) since the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty gave birth to today’s European Union. 
 
We begin by considering where the Commission stood when Juncker became President (section 1 
below).  The way in which the Juncker Commission was constructed and how it now operates are then 
investigated (section 2).   We consider the multiple possible meanings of ‘political Commission’ (see 
section 3).  The Commission’s prospects (section 4) in an EU dominated by a ‘seemingly hegemonic 
Germany’ (Dinan 2015: 93) are then considered, particularly in light of the theoretical claims of the 
new intergovernmentalism.  Our conclusion reflects on the fate of both the Commission and the EU 
amidst enormous political turbulence, and how theory might explain practice. 
 
1.  From Prodi to Barroso to Juncker 
Debate about the Commission’s standing has featured prominently in the EU research literature since 
the entire College of Commissioners resigned under Jacques Santer’s Presidency in 1999 (see Hodson 
2013; Kassim et al 2013: 130-50; Wallace and Reh 2015).  What often goes unappreciated is how the 
Commission’s weakness at that moment became a shared concern of all EU stakeholders.  Two 
examples illustrate.   
 
The first was the Berlin European Council’s decision, just over a week after Santer’s resignation and 
after 10 minutes of discussion, to appoint Romano Prodi, the first former Prime Minister of a large EU 
state (Italy) to become Commission President.  Previously, Prodi had earned political respect for 
assembling a centre-left coalition that defeated Silvio Berlusconi’s alliance in the 1996 Italian election.  
4 
 
His government then succeeded in restoring Italy’s economic health to the point where it joined the 
Euro, a goal previously viewed as unreachable.   
 
Prodi’s subsequent tenure (1999-2004) as Commission President was hardly an unambiguous success.  
Officials who served under him rated his performance only marginally stronger than that of Santer 
(see Kassim et al 2013: 165).  Still, Prodi’s prioritisation of administrative reform of the Commission 
(Schön-Quinlivan 2011), with former UK Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock piloting root and branch 
change, endeared him to European leaders.3  Prodi also helped shift the debate on enlargement to 
the point where a previously hesitant European Council opened accession negotiation with no fewer 
than 12 applicant states.  Whatever our verdict on Prodi, restoring the position of the Commission 
was widely-viewed as vital after Santer’s fall. 
 
Another example further illustrates how an effective Commission is considered a European public 
good.  The proposal by the 2002-3 Convention of the Future of Europe (in its draft Constitutional 
Treaty) to reduce the size of the College to make it more efficient embraced an idea that originated in 
the 1979 Spierenburg report (see Kassim et al 2013: 208).  A smaller College was viewed by Dirk 
Spierenburg – a former member of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (the 
Commission’s precursor) - as less compartmentalised, with fewer, larger policy portfolios better 
coordinated.  Spierenburg’s injunction was subsequently ignored.  Yet the size of the Commission 
became ‘one of the most passionately debated’ issues in all (5) intergovernmental conferences held 
to consider EU treaty change in the post-Maastricht period (Piris 2010: 226).  The Treaty of Nice (2001) 
mandated that ‘the number of Members of the Commission should be less than the number of 
Member States’ once the EU had enlarged to 27 or more.  Vaguely, the Treaty signalled that ‘a rotation 
system based on the principle of equality’ would then come into effect.  The point was reached on 1st 
January 2007 with the Commission under the (first) Presidency of José Manuel Barroso (2004-14), 
Portugal’s former Prime Minister.  At the time, the need to find portfolios for new Commissioners 
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from Bulgaria and Romania led to the wisecrack that they would be assigned Christmas cards and car 
parks.  As such, after the demise of the (2004) Constitutional Treaty, a new IGC (to negotiate what 
became the 2007 Lisbon Treaty) decreed that the College would be reduced to two-thirds the number 
of member states, again with a system of equal rotation.  The cherished right of each state to send 
one of their own to Brussels, who could then appear in the national media and explain in their own 
language what the Commission and EU were doing, was thus sacrificed for the sake of a more efficient 
College. 
 
These plans went awry when Ireland’s 2008 referendum on Lisbon yielded a ‘no’.  A sticking point in 
the Irish debate was the end of its right – as a small state with a very local political culture – always to 
nominate a Commissioner.  To coax an Irish ‘yes’, the European Council decided in December 2008 to 
abandon reducing the size of the College.  Nearly 30 years after Spierenburg found a College (of 13) 
too big, the EU reverted to one Commissioner per member state, or a whopping 28 in Barroso’s second 
Commission (2009-14).   
 
The size of the Commission matters.  First, the College decides by simple majority with one vote per 
Commissioner.  In an enlarged EU, it became possible for decisions to be adopted by Commissioners 
from states comprising only 11.32 per cent of the Union’s population.  Commissioners from the six 
largest member states – with over 70 per cent of the Union’s inhabitants – could be outvoted (Piris 
2010: 226-7).4   
 
Of course, the Commission rarely votes.  Barroso boasted that no votes were needed in his first 
Commission and ‘probably 5’ in his second (quoted in Keating 2014a).  Moreover, the EU’s Treaties 
make clear the independence of Commissioners from their or any other member government.  Once 
confirmed, Commissioners even take an oath of independence.  Still, a College that for the first time 
had the same composition as all versions of the Council of Ministers led to fears of ‘the Commission 
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falling into a sort of intergovernmentalism’ (Piris 2010: 226), with its decisions – like those of the 
Council – the result of deals struck by agents of EU governments.  Here, arguably, we find tangible 
evidence of the new intergovernmentalist claim that post-Maastricht EU governments frequently 
make institutional choices that ‘limit further expansion of the powers of the Commission’ (Bickerton 
et al 2015: 39), or at least constrain its autonomy.   
 
An early assessment of enlargement’s effect on the Commission asked whether the very meaning of 
‘intergovernmentalism’ had to be rethought.  Enlargement implied ‘more complicated bargaining and 
coalition-building, which in itself might actually make the position of the Commission stronger’ 
(Peterson 2008: 775).  A Commission with – to put it benignly – one main access point per national 
capital might end up less autonomous but more integrated into the EU’s institutional system. 
 
Barroso’s response to an enlarged College was to run a highly centralised Commission.  Soon after his 
appointment, Barroso warned of the dangers of ‘fragmentation’ or ‘Balkanisation’ of the College 
(Kassim et al 2013: 166).  He then then used his cabinet (of personal advisors) to keep a grip on the 
policy agenda.  The role of the Secretariat-General - responsible for servicing the College, linking it to 
the permanent services (Directorates-General; DGs), and overseeing coordination – was transformed.  
In the past, the ‘Sec-Gen’ was a mostly neutral arbiter.  Under Barroso it became almost an extension 
of the President’s cabinet and enforcer of his agenda.  When surveyed in 2008, a clear majority of 
Commission officials – nearly 60 per cent – agreed with the statement:  ‘The Secretariat-General is 
becoming more political and influential in the life of the Commission’ (Kassim et al 2013: 194).   
 
Yet, another possible illustration of new intergovernmentalist constraints was how Barroso’s 
Commissions were judged as unambitious (see Hodson 2013).  His claim that ‘the basic legitimacy of 
our Union is the member states’ tarred him with the brush of intergovernmentalism.  As Juncker 
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replaced Barroso, a typical comment on the latter’s legacy was:  ‘a period in which the Commission 
lost influence in the face of member states and failed to set the agenda’ (Keating 2014a). 
 
Barroso fought back and defended his record.  The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty had been 
handled smoothly and given the Commission new powers in multiple policy areas, particularly Justice 
and Home Affairs.  Coordination with the new permanent President of the European Council, Herman 
Van Rompuy, meant Barroso and his Commission were central players in the eurozone crisis, laying 
the groundwork for the European Stability Mechanism (a permanent crisis resolution fund of €500 
billion) and the ‘two pack’ and ‘six pack’ sets of legislation that reformed EU economic governance.  
Barroso insisted ‘[w]e now have powers and competencies that our predecessors could not even 
dream of’ (quoted in Keating 2014a).  The list extended to surveillance (even rejection) of draft 
member state budgets, EU supervision of European banks, and execution of a new intergovernmental 
fiscal pact.  One senior Commission official mused that Barroso’s would ‘end up viewed as [two] of the 
most successful Commissions in history.  We almost lost our currency, our [EU] budget and banking 
sector.  But a lot of crises got solved’.5 
 
Finally, Barroso insisted that far more attention focused on who would replace him than Van Rompuy:  
‘That was the real debate about who was going to lead Europe.  If the Commission was irrelevant, do 
you think all that debate would have taken place?’ (quoted in Keating 2014a).  Barroso was certainly 
right that choosing his successor provoked an intense political row.  Judging where the Juncker 
Commission stands starts by considering how it was constructed. 
 
2.  Constructing the Juncker Commission 
The nomination of Juncker via the Spitzenkandidaten system was, by itself, enough to politicise his 
Presidency as none ever before.  The EP’s political groups interpreted the Lisbon Treaty as a mandate 
to put forward candidates for the Commission’s top job, and then for the European Council to choose 
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the Spitzenkandidat whose group won the 2014 EP election.  Opposition to Juncker personally (too 
much of a ‘federalist’) and to the method by which he was chosen was led by the UK’s David Cameron, 
under pressure from his increasingly eurosceptic Conservative party.  Cameron seemed to find support 
from Germany’s Angela Merkel, who initially agreed to consider other candidates (‘anything is 
possible’6) and signalled that the prerogative of the European Council to choose the Commission 
President should be preserved.  So did the premiers of Hungary and Sweden (and, by some accounts, 
the Netherlands).7 
 
However, between European Council meetings in May and June 2015, Merkel endured a firestorm in 
Germany over her refusal to back Juncker.  Much of the national press was indignant, with Bild 
(Germany’s top-selling newspaper) complaining: 
Europeans want Juncker as EU president.  [The German candidate of the Socialist group, 
Martin] Schulz got the second best result.  A third, who didn't stand for election, can't be 
allowed to get the job.  That would turn democracy into a farce.  You may get away with 
something like that in the GDR [East Germany] or in far-right banana republics.  But not in the 
EU. 
 
The influential philosopher Jürgen Habermas told Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that if the European 
Council ‘were to suggest someone else as a leading candidate, it would be a bullet to the heart of the 
European project.  In that case you couldn’t expect any citizen to ever involve themselves in a 
European election again’.8  Juncker hailed from the same political family as Merkel’s own Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), whose MEPs rallied in his support as did Merkel’s domestic coalition partner, 
the Social Democrats.  All pressures pointed one way.  In swinging behind Juncker, Merkel poured 
scorn on Cameron’s call to ‘stand up’ against an EP ‘stitch up’ and his linking of Juncker’s appointment 
to the result of the foreseen UK referendum:  ‘we act in a European spirit…Threats are not part and 
parcel of that spirit’.9 
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Juncker was confirmed by a European Council vote of 26-2.  Only Victor Orban, advocate of Hungary 
as ‘illiberal state’10 analogous to Russia or Turkey, voted with Cameron.  By one interpretation, the 
large majority for Juncker – including the Swedish and Dutch Prime Ministers – reflected how the EU 
was German-led as never before.  By another, it simply mirrored the in-built centre-right majority on 
the European Council that selected one of their own in Juncker, in perhaps yet another sign of member 
governments wishing to restrain the Commission along new intergovernmentalist lines.  Even if the 
EP election had produced a different result, it would have been hard to see Schultz, a Socialist, chosen 
instead.11   
 
In any event, after the EP’s power grab and Juncker’s confirmation (by an EP vote of 422-250, with 47 
abstentions), most member states made their own decisions about whom to nominate to the College 
with little input from Juncker.  The College that emerged contained an abundance of former Prime or 
Foreign Ministers, but also others with little high level experience (see table 1).  The list started with 
Federica Mogherini, chosen – also by the European Council – as the EU’s High Representative for the 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice-President.  The choice was not uncontested, 
with many Central and Eastern European states considering Mogherini too pro-Russian (after Russia 
had annexed Crimea).12  However, the Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, enjoyed an unassailable 
position after his (and Mogherini’s) party won 41 per cent of the vote in Italy’s 2014 EP election.  
Besides, Mogherini offered balance prioritised in any share-out of EU jobs, in terms of gender and 
large v. small states, as well as qualifications and competence, as she subsequently showed (see 
below).   
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Juncker designated the same number of Vice-Presidents as Barroso (7) but declared that they would 
work differently than in the past.  Frans Timmermans – former Dutch Foreign Minister – was labelled 
the first-ever ‘First Vice-President’.  The move made political sense for Juncker, who announced that 
Timmermans would play a central role in the renegotiation of the UK’s status prior to the referendum 
promised by Cameron, with whom Juncker had an obviously scratchy relationship.  In his EP 
confirmation hearing, Timmermans wooed the UK by promising to cut red tape, extolling Winston 
Churchill, and calling the UK ‘the birthplace of common sense’.13  Revealingly, Timmermans also took 
pains to be deferential to MEPs, hailing how Juncker’s was ‘the first Commission born in the European 
Parliament’.14 
  
Tapping Timmermans – a Socialist - to be First VP also allowed Juncker to give his Commission a 
semblance of political balance.  VP appointments were split between the Socialist and centre-right 
European People’s Party (EPP) with 3 each and 1 for the Liberal Andrus Ansip, a former Estonian Prime 
Minister.  Still, the College was dominated by the EPP, with exactly half (14) of its members linked to 
the centre right, as compared to only 8 Socialists and 5 Liberals (see Table 1), a result that (again) the 
new intergovernmentalism would predict as a way for EU states to control or constrain the 
Commission.  By the numbers, the 2014 EP election yielded a Parliament made up of 30 per cent EPP 
and 25 per cent Socialist MEPs (and only 7 per cent Liberals), with Socialists actually winning slightly 
more votes overall.15 
 
Juncker’s limited influence over national selections allowed him to disclaim responsibility for loading 
the College with members of his own political family.  But several nominations caused him political 
headaches.  One was Cameron’s choice of (Lord) Jonathan Hill, a backroom operator in the UK 
Conservative party who was almost unknown even in his own country.  Cameron lobbied for Hill to be 
given a major portfolio and Juncker assigned him the financial services brief of cardinal importance to 
the City of London.  MEPs gave Hill a rough ride, hauling him back for a second confirmation hearing 
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after he was lacklustre in his first.   Subsequently, however, Hill was nodded through with the proviso 
that enforcing EU rules on bankers’ bonuses (challenged by the UK in the European Court of Justice) 
would be assigned to the Czech Justice Commissioner, Vĕra Jourová.  
 
Then there was Slovenia’s Alenka Bratušek, who nominated herself for the Commission during her 
final days as Prime Minister after losing her party’s leadership.  Her self-nomination had failed even 
to find majority support in her own cabinet, forcing her to use special rules of procedure allowing 
absent ministers to be counted as voting in favour.  Nonetheless, Juncker made Bratušek Vice 
President for Energy Union and defended her as a former premier who had saved her country from 
an EU bail-out.16  He thus did himself no favours when Bratušek gave a dreadful performance in her 
EP hearing.  After meeting with leaders of EP party groups, Juncker accepted Slovenia’s fresh 
nomination of Violeta Bulc, an entrepreneur with only weeks of experience in the post-Bratušek 
government.  Uncannily, Bulc’s nomination had to be rammed through the Slovenian cabinet using 
the same special procedure as Bratušek’s (Keating 2014b). 
 
Bulc’s inexperience ruled her out for the energy job.  In ‘another gamble’ by Juncker (Keating 2014c), 
the Slovakian nominee, Maroš Šefčovič, was shifted to energy with Bulc offered transport.  In some 
ways, Šefčovič seemed a safe choice after serving as a competent Commissioner for Administration in 
Barroso II.  Yet, his links were close to Slovakia’s centre-left government led by Robert Fico, an avowed 
ally of Putin’s Russia and dissenter on EU climate and energy policy.  Under Barroso, Šefčovič twice 
had voted the Slovak line in opposing proposed emissions reductions.   
 
In the end, Šefčovič and Bulc were both confirmed.  However, Juncker had to appease the Parliament’s 
Transport Committee which declared itself ‘very disappointed with the reshuffle’.17 Juncker thus 
added transport to Šefčovič’s ‘mission letter’, a set of instructions sent to Commissioners outlining 
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their duties and – in the case of Šefčovič and other VPs - which other Commissioners’ work they would 
‘steer and coordinate’.18  
 
Juncker’s mission letters (all around 6 pages long) aimed to make clear what would be different about 
his Commission.  Specifically, it would be a ‘political Commission’:  ‘I want the new Commission to be 
a strong and political team’, working on the basis of guidelines that are ‘somewhat akin to a political 
contract that I concluded with the European Parliament’, with the Commission’s work focused on ‘the 
priorities of the Political Guidelines’, and so on.19  All stressed the special role of Timmermans, warning 
that his approval was required for ‘full political ownership’ of any proposed new initiative.   
 
Juncker’s mission letters as well as his first communications to DGs (2014a; 2014b) decreed 10 projects 
listed in his Political Guidelines on which his Commission would focus.  Yet, the inventory read like a 
laundry list.  It combined specific objectives – a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
with the United States, a Capital Markets Union, and a €300 billion investment plan – with 
categorically vague ones:  ‘making the EU a stronger global actor’ or ‘bringing about a Union of 
democratic change’ (Commission 2014a: 2).  
 
Still, Juncker was clear that he had ‘decided to organise the new Commission different[ly] from its 
predecessors…to overcome silo mentalities’.  Vice-Presidents would oversee and coordinate the work 
of ‘portfolio’ Commissioners so as to ‘help me exercise my presidential prerogatives’ (Commission 
2014a: 2).  Each VP would lead a project team of Commissioners in areas such as ‘Euro and social 
dialogue’, ‘energy union’, or ‘digital single market’.  Vice-Presidents would not have DGs working 
under them and instead would rely on a beefed-up Secretariat-General, which would ‘play an 
enhanced coordinating role for major initiatives’ (Commission 2014b: 1). 
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Juncker was bold in seeking to solve the problem of an overlarge College, but by no means was he the 
first to try.  Santer created 6 ‘Groupes de Commissaires’ to coordinate related policies, but they took 
no actual decisions and merely exchanged information.  Prodi could claim some credit for a ‘strange 
and complicated formula’ (Piris 2010: 228) proposed at one point by the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, by which a sub-set of Commissioners could vote in the College with others participating as 
non-voters.  Earlier, Prodi had proposed an inner cabinet of 10 VPs meeting weekly with exclusive 
rights to vote, with all other Commissioners relegated to once or twice-monthly ‘political strategy’ 
sessions.  Both formulas died political deaths.  Barroso made his own bid to create five ‘clusters’ of 
Commissioners in areas including competitiveness, external relations, and equal opportunities 
(Peterson 2012: 112).  But none made the College any more cohesive, thus leading him to pull the 
Secretariat-General into his own orbit. 
 
Juncker’s formula broke genuinely new organisational ground and allowed for more strategic use of 
the Commission’s powers.  To illustrate, Mogherini was designated as responsible for all EU external 
affairs, including trade policy.  Trade had never been within the remit of previous High 
Representatives, and Juncker’s new system created the prospect, at least, that the EU’s economic 
weight might be used (as rarely before) to support its general foreign policy agenda. 
 
Of course, the VP system also threatened to blur responsibility.  It left ‘his Vice-Presidents potentially 
stranded without the support of their line Commissioners’, and thus ‘[m]uch more than any political 
agenda, [Juncker’s] political management skills are likely to define this Commission’ (Global Counsel 
2014: 2).  As we show (below), Juncker’s new formula has elicited mixed views from officials of a kind 
predictable when any administration embraces radical change.  The question of whether it will work 
to make the Commission more efficient, effective and strategic is wrapped up in larger questions:  
what does it mean to be a political Commission?  And was Juncker’s intent to reassert the 
Commission’s autonomy in the face of new intergovernmentalist constraints in the modern EU? 
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3.  A ‘Political’ Commission? 
An early reaction to Juncker’s political Commission came from Barroso, who damned the idea with 
faint praise:  ‘I think the Commission has to be – and mine was – a political body.  But it should not be 
a politicised or partisan body.  I think the Commission should remain a political body, but my advice is 
to avoid partisan lines of fracture and polarisation’ (quoted in Keating 2014a).   
 
Plausibly, Juncker’s vision may have followed from his selection via the Spitzenkandidaten system, 
which he claimed gave him more legitimacy and his College a mandate.  But one senior Commission 
official poured scorn on these notions: 
Juncker has a very party political agenda.  The Spitzenkandidat was a very bad idea.  Our 
mandate lacks legitimacy…We are confusing political messaging with our policy role.  We have 
become too party political…we need to be more evidence-based, and a party political agenda 
is the opposite of that.20 
 
 
Another view held that any mandate from the EP was worth far less than one from the EU’s most 
powerful member states, as had occurred in the past with the Kohl-Mitterrand alliance on monetary 
union or ‘Merkozy’ consensus during the Eurozone crisis (see Global Counsel 2014).  With basic 
divisions between Paris and Berlin on the eurozone’s evolution, and other large member states 
focused on national priorities (the UK on its 2016 referendum and Italy on budget flexibility), Juncker 
lacked any intergovernmental bargain on which to build a policy programme.   
 
Nevertheless, senior officials were upbeat about the first half of the Juncker Commission.  One head 
(‘chef’) for a portfolio Commissioner’s cabinet noted: 
A star chamber chaired by Timmermans has cut lots of proposals; more than ever before.  
Finally, we’ve got someone asking ‘why are we doing this’?…We need a slimmed down agenda 
on jobs and growth, with every portfolio geared to how we get more.  A political Commission 
means we’re going to look at what is politically necessary and possible…We’re going to focus 
on 2 or 3 political priorities.21 
 
The verdict of a top official in the Secretariat-General was emphatic: 
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It’s a revolution in the way the Commission is run – in a good way…previously, we had 27 
portfolios all working in isolation.  It was the silo mentality run riot…A ‘political Commission’?  
I don’t know what that means; it can be interpreted in many different ways.  If it means 
political prioritisation, that’s very welcome.  If it means a party political orientation, then no:  
that etiquette doesn’t travel across borders.22 
 
Another senior official insisted: 
I actually do think stressing the political agenda gives us more legitimacy.  I don’t personally 
believe in the Spitzencandidaten system, but it means the Commission can defend itself from 
its detractors…For example, in our assessments of the Italian, French and Belgian budgets, we 
treated them in a more flexible and thus political way, and not purely mechanically.  Barroso 
couldn’t do that because he lacked the legitimacy that Juncker has.23   
 
The new formula also provided Juncker flexibility to allocate dossiers to ensure neutrality.  He thus 
appeased Cameron by giving Hill financial services, but also pacified the EP by stripping banker 
bonuses out of his portfolio.  The VP system allowed him to clip the wings of the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Commissioner, France’s Pierre Moscovici.  Juncker required him legally (and uniquely) 
to submit assessments of national budgets together with Latvia’s Valdis Dombrovski, a deficit hawk 
and VP for the Euro.  The move made political sense as Moscovici previously served as French Finance 
Minister and the Commission was required to rule on the French budget only two weeks after its 
instatement in November 2014.24   
 
One of the Commission’s Directors-General (most senior permanent officials) was even-handed: 
I’m favourable to the VP system:  it is a bold experiment that obviously depends on good will, 
but things were too ‘siloed’ before.  It empowers the Sec-Gen enormously, with the result that 
I’m not unlikely to have some 35 year old twerp telling me what I should do in my portfolio.  
The VPs need to be authoritative, not authoritarian.  If the new system damages collegiality 
within the College, well, that was all kind of myth in the past anyway.25 
 
 
A definitive verdict on Juncker’s shake-up must wait until the end of his mandate, as does a clear 
analytical read on what it means to be a political Commission.  The latter clearly has potential pitfalls, 
as illustrated when the College endorsed Stavros Dimas’ candidacy for President of Greece in late 
2014, since Dimas was a former Commissioner and his election (by the Greek parliament) ‘could help 
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remove uncertainties around financial markets’.26   Of course, Dimas’ candidacy was rejected, forcing 
Greece to hold a snap election with the fiercely anti-austerity and eurosceptic Syriza party sweeping 
to power.  Advocates of a political Commission thus have to be careful about what they wish for. 
 
 
4. The Juncker Commission and the New Intergovernmentalism 
 
What fate can we predict for Juncker’s Commission?  And what light might be shed by the new 
intergovernmentalism, or ‘integration without traditional forms of delegation’ (Bickerton et al 2015: 
4-5), specifically to the Commission?  As ever, a lot will depend on factors beyond the Commission’s 
control.   
 
One is the leak of 28,000 pages of confidential documents detailing tax deals that were cut between 
large multinationals and Luxembourg while Juncker was Prime Minister of the Duchy.  Juncker insisted 
Luxembourg’s tax authority had acted on an ‘autonomous basis’, but conceded that he was ‘politically’ 
responsible.  With Luxembourg already under investigation by the Commission for sweetheart deals 
with Fiat and Amazon, Juncker promised new EU legislation to make such tax affairs more transparent.  
But one senior Commission official spoke for many in concluding:  ‘this could harm all of us…Juncker 
might say the wrong thing about it some day when he’s being flippant or is angry.  It could be a 
disaster’.27 
 
A second factor likely to determine the Commission’s fate was the nature of the ‘brain behind the 
brain’ at the top.  Numerous interviewees agreed ‘we have a weak President with a strong chief of 
staff’,28 who was – by most accounts – ‘brilliant intellectually but with no people skills’.29  Juncker’s 
chef, Martin Selmayr, managed the former’s campaign to become the centre-right Spitzencandidat 
after serving in top positions in the Commission and posts linked to the German CDU.30  Not since 
Pascal Lamy had dominated the Commission as Jacques Delors’ number two did any chef appear to 
wield such untrammelled influence.  One illustrative incident concerned Juncker’s clean-up after the 
17 
 
Bratušek mess.31  After her nomination was withdrawn, Selmayr passed Šefčovič in a corridor of the 
Berlaymont (the Commission’s headquarters) and told him that Juncker wanted to shift Šefčovič from 
transport to VP for Energy Union.  Mindful that he had already sat his EP confirmation on transport, 
Šefčovič asked Selmayr to arrange a meeting with Juncker to discuss the new proposal.  The following 
morning, Šefčovič arrived at his office to find an email from Selmayr indicating that Juncker would 
announce the Slovak’s nomination as VP for Energy Union that day at a 12 noon press conference 
unless he urgently objected.   
 
One official with cabinet experience warned that ‘people are afraid of Martin.  He’s a symbol of 
unaccountable power in the hands of people who are inexperienced and don’t know the house’.32  
Another cited an early dispute between Juncker and the new Trade Commissioner, the Swede Cecilia 
Malmström, about the ultra-sensitive Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the TTIP 
negotiations, with Selmayr apparently doctoring written evidence in response to MEP questions 
during Malmström’s confirmation which the latter was forced to disavow.  An official close to 
Malmström described the flap as ‘all Martin…he’s tried to push through a lot before Commissioners 
found their feet’.33   
 
Juncker clearly relied heavily on Selmayr.  One reason why was that Timmerman’s performance was 
mixed at best.  While credited with good communication skills, one chef observed: ‘he’s doesn’t want 
to talk to officials.  He only talks to ministers’.34  Another (Sec-Gen) official was scathing:  ‘He says 
nothing in 5 languages.  He…works on the basis of anecdotal evidence and doesn’t invest the time 
needed in knowing the files’.35  One result was that power was centralised in Juncker’s office, often in 
the hands of Selmayr.  A cabinet official involved in the ‘Five President’s Report’ (on strengthening 
monetary union36) claimed:  ‘Martin wrote it himself.  Dombrovskis [VP for the euro], the poor guy, 
had to present it to the media even though he had nothing to do with it’.37  Meanwhile, Timmermans’ 
role suggested that delegation to VPs was strictly limited:  ‘to say he’s the most powerful VP isn’t 
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saying much.  They’re mostly being used to sell [Commission] initiatives….Martin has “done” Greece 
himself and he will “do” BREXIT [the UK’s demands for reforms] himself’.38 
 
All of this might be viewed as the normal sturm und drang of a new Commission bedding down, 
especially a ‘political’ one.  Yet, if Selmayr was the power behind the throne, it pointed to another 
fate-determining factor for Juncker’s Commission:  how German-dominated it appeared.  By one 
estimate, no fewer than 41 Germans served in Commission cabinets in the Juncker Commission, up 
from an approximate (fluctuating) total of 22-7 during the Barroso decade.39  This result no doubt 
reflected the wish of Commissioners to have a political line to Berlin, the centrality of Merkel to 
Juncker’s chosen projects, but also – as alleged by one official – how ‘Martin [Selmayr] insisted on 
them, even though many are very inexperienced’.40 
 
But it also reflected how German-dominated the EU had become more generally (see Beck 2013).  
With the UK in such bad odour, France’s weak economy, and crucial decisions still to be made on 
Banking Union and the refugee crisis, Merkel and Berlin were essential players.  One official claimed a 
‘Germanification of the EU’s institutions.  A sort of cultural creep.  The Germans just don’t get the 
services sector, they only do manufacturing…In a sense, the Germans don’t really “do” markets, but 
still think what they’re doing is universally valid’.41  Another suggested that the EP was ‘also very 
German-dominated.  The German EP groups are very cohesive in relative terms’.42  The upshot was 
that Juncker’s fortunes were likely to be shaped by decisions taken in Berlin as much as in Brussels. 
 
A final determinant of Juncker’s success is how his political agenda plays out in practice.  Focusing on 
a limited number of priorities inevitably meant others falling by the wayside.  A focus on jobs and 
growth made sense, but at what cost to environmental protection or climate change?  Juncker’s 
political messaging gave no hint that either would be a prime concern.  Meanwhile, his lack of 
influence over nominations to his College meant accommodating peculiar characters.  A bird-
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shooting Maltese, Karmenu Vella, was designated Environment Commissioner.  A Spaniard with links 
to the oil industry, Miguel Arias Caňete, got climate change.  It did not require much cynicism to 
suspect that one reason Juncker opted for a new system of empowering VPs was to ensure that 
these and other Commissioners toed the party line.   
 
At first blush, Juncker’s political Commission appears to fly in the face of the new 
intergovernmentalism as a theoretical paradigm.  Bickerton et al (2105) portray the Commission as 
losers in the advance of cooperative solutions that eschew traditional methods of integration.  
Consensus and deliberation have become ends in themselves, even if the Commission (under Barroso) 
was often complicit in the change.  Instead of delegating prerogatives to the Commission, EU member 
states now delegate to de novo, often intergovernmental bodies.  The result is a state of disequilibrium 
based on a ‘pro-integration consensus that has had to be institutionally shielded from growing public 
disenchantment with public policy outcomes’ (Bickerton et al 2015: 37). 
 
An audit of how the Commission’s evolution fits with the hypotheses of the new 
intergovernmentalism (Peterson 2015), let alone a critique of the paradigm’s credibility more 
generally (see Schimmelfenning 2015), are not possible here.  Still, two points – one about the 
Commission’s role and the other about how we define intergovernmental – arise from analysis of the 
Juncker Commission’s first years.   First, Commission action is clearly needed to deal with the EU’s 
crises, as illustrated above all by its politically noxious but nonetheless approved September 2015 
proposal on sharing out an estimated 120,000 migrants arriving in Greece, Italy and Hungary43 (even 
if it was swiftly overtaken by events).  Juncker’s forcing of a vote on quotas as well as his personal 
investment in the Greek crisis led one official to contend: ‘this Commission takes political risks in a 
way Barroso never did…Juncker is far more ambitious.  Barroso never would’ve proposed quotas’.44   
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Explicitly tasking the Commission with political objectives and claiming a mandate from the EP was 
always a high risk strategy.  Yet, given the need to cope with multiple crises, Juncker could argue that 
his Commission had be a political one, and it was possible to credit him with admitting as much.  An 
illustrative example was the Commission’s need to judge whether Poland – after the election of an 
ultra-nationalist Law and Justice party government in 2015 – had violated the terms of the EU Treaty 
by packing Poland’s top court and state-run media with party loyalists.  A ‘nuclear option’ for Juncker’s 
Commission was to strip Poland of its right to vote in the Council on EU laws.45  One of Juncker’s top 
advisors argued ‘he will sometimes lead on process like a Prime Minister.  He won’t wait for consensus 
but will push for it, doing things as a [head of] government does’.46  
  
Second, considerable evidence suggests that new intergovernmentalist delegation has not weakened 
the Commission.  A study of budget surveillance and banking union finds the Commission ‘more 
proactive than much of the literature suggests’, and rejects any loss of its ‘influence, authority, 
initiative and effectiveness…quite the contrary’ (Savage and Verdun 2016: 114).  Meanwhile, the 
Commission and de novo agencies have formed ‘tight relationships’, colluded in task expansion where 
the Commission previously was weak, and produced ‘a centralization of EU executive power’ (Egeberg 
et al 2015: 609-10).  Even in social policy, entrepreneurship by the Commission has ‘considerably 
strengthened its oversight and constraining powers’ but in ‘a new form of hybrid governance that 
combines political intergovernmentalism and technocratic supranationalism’ (Crespy and Menz 2015: 
765). 
The latter point suggests a need to redefine ‘intergovernmental’.  Credibly, the supranational v. 
intergovernmental dichotomy describes a debate that reached its height during the Delors era, and is 
now confined to the past.  A paradigm shift in the way the EU works may well have occurred post-
Maastricht.  But the Commission often has seemed complicit in it.  Not only by gauging what the 
political traffic will bear (as under Barroso), but (under Juncker) being ‘more connected to the political 
process’47 (in the words of one his advisors) and influencing debates in the European Council, where 
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Junker’s experience far out-stripped that of Barroso.  One indicator of this connection was that no 
fewer than 90 per cent of the Juncker College were members of their state’s governing parties, the 
highest share in the Commission’s history.48  None of this is to deny that the Commission and European 
Council remain rivals in a kind of ‘competitive cooperation’, but one in which they are ‘joint agenda 
setters’ (Bocquillion and Doebbels 2014).  What is new about the new intergovernmentalism is that 
simple binaries about who wins or loses when European integration advances are no longer helpful. 
Juncker will have to pick his battles carefully.  Still, his Commission already has begun to make its mark 
in ways that flesh out what the new intergovernmentalism might look like and the role of the 
Commission in it.  The Commission appears more closely linked to EU national capitals, yet pushing 
the policy agenda itself in an EU that is no longer moving towards federation but is, ‘[p]erhaps 
ironically…more involved…in the exercise of core state powers’ (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016: 55).   
CONCLUSION 
We have ranged widely in investigating what may be distinct about the Juncker Commission.  We can 
be confident about some things:  his is the most explicitly political Commission ever, the new VP 
system is a radical departure, and the College’s links to national capitals are more direct.  We also 
have evidence to sustain three more general points. 
 
The first reflects but also extends beyond Juncker.  The EU appeared to equip its institutions with 
genuine leaders in 2014 after previously appointing (to be charitable) unthreatening figures to its top 
posts.  Van Rompuy’s successor as European Council President – the former Polish Prime Minister 
(2007-14), Donald Tusk – emerged as ‘crisis-manager-in-chief’, coaxing tough agreements on Greece 
(once by refusing to allow Merkel and French President François Hollande to leave the room) and 
urging European liberals to be ‘tough and determined not to become more like right-wing populists, 
but to protect Europe against them’.49  Tusk’s role in brokering a result to the UK renegotiation was 
active and essential.  By necessity, Mogherini operated more in the background but won plaudits for 
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her chairing of the negotiations that produced curbs on Iran’s nuclear programme.  In short, the EU 
equipped itself with top job heavyweights in 2014.   
 
Second, it is easy to forget how diverse the enlarged EU has become.  Its mosaic of national political 
cultures reflect, above all, widely varying democratic experiences.  Consider the farcical process by 
which Slovenian candidates for the Commission were nominated.  In reflecting on what 
‘intergovernmental’ now means, we might note that Šefčovič – previously a career diplomat – ran 
first on a list of prospective MEPs for Fico’s Slovakian Party of the Democratic Left in the 2014 EP 
election before being reappointed as Commissioner.  Ponder the irony of Jourová’s responsibility for 
policing limits on bankers’ bonuses, a job she no doubt could not have imagined holding while in a 
Czech prison on (apparently) trumped up corruption charges.50  Then there’s the perceived political 
need for Cameron to appoint a faceless unknown as UK Commissioner.  Juncker deserves sympathy 
for cobbling into a College such a diverse crew of both big beasts and neophytes.  As Barroso said of 
building his College, having never met many of its nominees, ‘it is like a blind date’ (quoted in 
Peterson 2012: 108). 
 
A final point is theoretical.  Our ability to describe, explain and predict the evolution of European 
integration using theories from the past is challenged by how unprecedentedly crisis-ridden the EU 
has become.  The new intergovernmentalism ‘does not claim to be a new grand theory of regional 
integration’ (Bickerton et al 2015: 45), but its hypotheses shed important light on the Commission or 
at least encourage us to investigate it in novel ways.   To illustrate, Hartlapp et al (2014) portray the 
Commission as very much a political actor as well as a system that both influences and is influenced 
by a diverse array of political currents.  Perhaps it has always been so.  Now – by necessity – the 
Commission is more in the thick of political debates that have potentially profound consequences.  To 
influence these debates and push for political solutions, it by definition must be more closely linked 
to national EU capitals and accept that its days as an ‘engine of integration’ are over.  Finally, we might 
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conclude that the Commission – and EU more generally – are adapting, or at least trying to do so, to 
previously unimaginably difficult circumstances.  The performance of Juncker’s political Commission 
is likely to go far towards determining Europe’s political future.   
 
References 
Bickerton, C., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U. (2015) (eds) The New Intergovernmentalism:  States and 
Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era (Oxford and New York:  Oxford University 
Press). 
Bocquillon, P. and Dobbels, M. (2014) ‘An Elephant on the 13th Floor of the Berlaymont?  European 
Council and Commission in Legislative Agenda Setting’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21 
(1): 20-38. 
Bruun, N., Lörcher, K. and Schömann, I. (2014) The Economic and Financial Crisis and Collective Labour 
Law in Europe (Oxford: Hart). 
Commission (2014a) Communication à la Commission relative aux methods de travail de la 
Commission, C (2014) 9004, 11 November 2014. 
Commission (2014b) Implementing the European Commission 2014-2019 Working Methods:  
Instructions to the Services, undated. 
Crespy, A. and Menz, G. (2015) ‘Commission Entrepreneurship and the Debasing of Social Europe 
Before and After the Eurocrisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 (4): 753-68. 
Dinan, D. (2015) ‘Governance and Institutions:  the Year of the Spitzenkadidaten’, JCMS Annual Review 
of the European Union in 2014, 53 (S1): 93-107. 
Egeberg, M., Trondal, J. and Vestland, N.M. (2015) ‘The Quest for Order:  Unravelling the Relationship 
Between the European Commission and EU Agencies’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22 
(5): 609-29. 
Gallagher, T. (2014) Europe’s Path to Crisis:  Disintegration Via Monetary Union (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press). 
24 
 
Genschel, P. and Jachtenfuchs, M. (2016) ‘More Integration, Less Federation:  the European 
Integration of Core State Powers’, Journal of European Public Policy, 23 (1): 42-59. 
Global Counsel (2014) Nature vs Nurture:  ‘The First European Commission Born in the European 
Parliament’?, 29 October; http://www.global-counsel.co.uk/publications/nature-vs-nurture-
%E2%80%98-first-eu-commission-born-eu-parliament%E2%80%99.  
Hartlapp, M., Metz, J. and Rauh, C. (2014) Which Policy for Europe?  Power and Conflict Inside the 
European Commission (Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press). 
Hodson, D. (2013) ‘The Little Engine that Wouldn’t.  Supranational Entrepreneurship and the Barroso 
Commission’, Journal of European Integration, 35 (3): 301-14. 
Kassim, H., Peterson, J., Bauer, M.W., Connolly, S., Dehousse, R., Hooghe, L. and Thompson, A. (2013) 
The European Commission of the 21st Century (Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press).  
Keating, D. (2014a) ‘”I Increased Power of the Commission” says Barroso’, European Voice, 10 October. 
Keating, D. (2014b) ‘Juncker Accepts Nomination of Violeta Bulc’, European Voice, 15 October. 
Keating, D. (2014c) ‘Juncker Takes Another Gamble, European Voice, 16 October. 
McNamara, K.R. (2015a) ‘The JCMS Annual Review Lecture: Imagining Europe – The Cultural 
Foundations of EU Governance’, JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2014, 53 (S1): 
22-39. 
McNamara, K.R. (2015b) The Politics of Everyday Europe:  Constructing Authority in the European 
Union (Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press).   
Majone, G. (2014) Rethinking the Union of Europe Post-Crisis: Has Integration Gone Too Far? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Peterson, J. (2008) ‘Enlargement, Reform and the European Commission:  Weathering a Perfect 
Storm?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (5): 761-80. 
___  (2012) ‘The College of Commissioners’ in J. Peterson and M. Shackleton (eds) The Institutions of 
the European Union (Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press), 3rd edition. 
25 
 
___  (2015) ‘The Commission and the New Intergovernmentalism:  Calm within the Storm?’ in 
Bickerton, C., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U. (2015) (eds) The New Intergovernmentalism:  States 
and Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era (Oxford and New York:  Oxford University 
Press). 
Phinnemore, D. (2015) ‘Crisis-Ridden, Battered and Bruised:  Time to Give Up on the EU?’, JCMS Annual 
Review of the European Union in 2014, 53 (S1): 61-74. 
Piris, J-C (2010) The Lisbon Treaty:  a Legal and Political Analysis (Cambridge and New York:  Cambridge 
University Press). 
Savage, J.D. and Verdun, A. (2016) ‘Strengthening the European Commission’s Budgetary and 
Economic Surveillance Capacity since Greece and the Euro area Crisis:  a Study of Five 
Directorates-General’, Journal of European Public Policy, 23 (1): 101-18. 
Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) ‘What’s the News in the “New Intergovernmentalism”?  A Critique of 
Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53 (4): 723-30. 
Schön-Quinvalin, E. (2011) Reforming the European Commission (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Soros, G. (2015) ‘Ukraine and Europe:  What Should Be Done?’, New York Review of Books, 8 October: 
4-8. 
Wallace, H. and Reh, C. (2015) ‘An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes’ in H. Wallace, M.A. 
Pollack and A.R. Young (eds) Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford and New York:  
Oxford University Press), 7th edition. 
 
1 See Bruun et al 2014; Gallagher 2014; Majone 2014; Peet and LaGuardia 2014; Crespy and Menz 2015; 
Phinnemore 2015; Savage and Verdun 2016. 
2 Lisbon (Article 17 (7) TEU) gives the EP the right to ‘elect’ the President of Commission as proposed by the 
European Council (of Heads of State and Government), whose proposal – by qualified majority voting – must 
take into account the results of EP elections.  Previously, the EP had the right to ‘approve’ the nomination put 
forward by the European Council. 
3 The Berlin summit’s Presidency Conclusions stated: ‘The European Union needs, as soon as possible, a strong 
Commission capable of taking action…the next Commission ought to give urgent priority to launching a far 
reaching programme of modernisation and reform’ (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ber1_en.htm).     
4 Piris’ (2010) figures relate to an EU of 27 since he was writing prior to Croatia’s accession in 2013. 
5 Interview, 7th January 2015. 
                                                          
26 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Quoted in The Guardian, 30 May 2014:  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/30/angela-merkel-
jean-claude-juncker-european-commission.  
7 BBC News, 10 June 2014; http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-27757991.   
8 This quote and excerpt from Bild from same source as note 8.  See also ‘Europa wird direkt ins Herz 
getroffen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 29 May 2015; http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/juergen-habermas-im-
gespraech-europa-wird-direkt-ins-herz-getroffen-12963798.html.  
9 Quoted in The Telegraph, 10 June 2014; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-
cameron/10888727/Dont-threaten-me-over-Juncker-appointment-Anglea-Merkel-warns-David-Cameron.html.   
10 Quoted in The Economist, 14 February 2015; http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21643194-germany-
and-other-european-countries-worry-about-hungarys-ties-russia-viktor-and-
vladimir?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e.   
11 I am grateful to Philippe de Schoutheete for suggesting this point. 
12 See BBC News, ‘Key EU jobs go to Italy and Poland’, http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-eu-28999186.   
13 Quoted in Financial Times, 9 October 2014. 
14 Quoted in Global Counsel (2014: 1). The lead author of this ‘Insight’ briefing is Stephen Adams, a top advisor 
to Peter Mandelson when he was EU Trade Commissioner. 
15 Juncker’s was not the first College accused of political imbalance.  Barroso’s first Commission had 13 
Christian Democrats, 6 Socialists and 8 Liberals (the latter very significantly over-represented).   
16 Financial Times, 9 October 2014.   
17 Michael Cramer, German Green MEP, quoted in Keating 2014c. 
18 Mission letters at http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019_en.   
19 Emphases added.   
20 Interview, 7th January 2015. 
21 Interview, 7th January 2015. 
22 Interview, 8th January 2015. 
23 Interview, 8th January 2015. 
24 See Financial Times, 30 September 2014. 
25 Interview, 8th January 2015. 
26 Annika Breidthardt, a Commission spokesperson quoted in Euractiv, 10 December 2014; 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/euro-finance/european-commission-officially-backs-government-
candidate-greek-elections.   
27 Interview, 7th January 2015.  Three co-defendants went on trial in Luxembourg for the leak of the documents 
in April 2016, even as their actions were backed by the French Finance Minister and nearly 130,000 citizens 
who had signed an on-line petition of support.  See BBC News, ‘France backs defendant as LuxLeaks trial 
starts’, 26 April; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36135626. 
28 Interview, 8th January 2015. 
29 Interview, 7th January 2015. 
30 A strikingly self-promotional copy of Selmayr’s CV is available at 
http://www.europainstitut.de/index.php?id=1166&L=1.   
31 This account of events was confirmed by 4 interviewees. 
32 Interview, 7th January 2015.   
33 Interview, 7th January 2015.  The saga is also detailed in Peter Spiegel’s (Financial Times) ‘Brussels blog’, 23 
October 2014; http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2014/10/23/leaked-letter-14-ministers-take-on-juncker-over-
trade/. 
34 Interview, 20th October 2015. 
35 Interview, 3rd July 2015. 
36 See http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf.  
37 Interview, 3rd July 2015.   
38 Interview, 20th October 2015. Indicative of the latter is that Selmayr was credited with devising the UK’s 
‘emergency brake’ on EU migrants’ access to benefits for 7 years (since the UK did not opt for 7-year 
transitional controls on east European migrants after the 2004 enlargement) as part of Cameron’s 
renegotiation. 
39 Author’s own calculations based on data available at:  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019_en. 
40 Interview, 7th January 2015. 
41 Interview, 7th January 2015. 
42 Interview, 9th January 2015. 
27 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
43 See BBC News, ‘Migrant Crisis:  EU Agrees Disputed Quota Plan’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
34329825; see also http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm.   
44 Interview, 3 July 2015. 
45 Financial Times, 19 May 2016. 
46 Interview, 20 October 2015. 
47 Interview, 20 October 2015. 
48 Figures from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/11/03/jean-claude-junckers-new-european-
commission-is-the-most-politicised-in-the-institutions-history/.   
49 Quoted in The Economist, 31st October 2015, p.42. 
50 See Financial Times, 27 September 2014. 
